

Reasons And Recognition Essays On The Philosophy Of T M Scanlon

[#T. M. Scanlon](#) [#Scanlon philosophy](#) [#reasons and recognition](#) [#philosophical essays](#) [#moral philosophy](#)

Explore profound insights into the philosophy of T. M. Scanlon with this compelling collection of essays. Delving into the intricate themes of reasons and recognition, these philosophical studies offer critical perspectives on Scanlon's influential work in moral philosophy. Essential reading for students and scholars alike.

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Reasons and Recognition

Reasons and Recognition brings together fourteen new papers on an array of topics from the many areas to which philosopher Thomas Scanlon has made path-breaking contributions, each of which develops a distinctive and independent position while critically engaging with central themes from Scanlon's own work in the area.

Blame

What is it to blame someone, and when are would-be blamers in a position to do so? What function does blame serve in our lives, and is it a valuable way of relating to one another? The essays in this volume explore answers to these and related questions.

The Nature of Moral Responsibility

Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement about what it is to be morally responsible for something. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates. The contributors include prominent established figures as well as influential younger philosophers.

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes

in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible. The traditional debates about moral responsibility focus on the threats posed from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result. The articles in this volume build on these arguments and appraise the most recent developments in these debates. Philosophical reflection on the personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and several articles reflect this development. Other chapters take up the link between blameworthiness and attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, while others explore the role that forgiveness and reconciliation play in personal relationships and responsibility. The range of articles in this volume look at moral responsibility from a range of perspectives and disciplines, explaining how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible.

Anger and Forgiveness

In this volume based on her 2014 'Locke Lectures', Martha C. Nussbaum provides a bracing new view that strips the notion of forgiveness down to its Judeo-Christian roots, where it was structured by the moral relationship between a score-keeping God and penitent, self-abasing and erring mortals.

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology

Moral psychology is the study of how human minds make and are made by human morality. This state-of-the-art volume covers contemporary philosophical and psychological work on moral psychology, as well as notable historical theories and figures in the field of moral psychology, such as Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, and the Buddha. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology's fifty chapters, authored by leading figures in the field, cover foundational topics, such as character, virtue, emotion, moral responsibility, the neuroscience of morality, weakness of will, and the nature of moral judgments and reasons. The volume also canvases emerging work in applied moral psychology, including adaptive preferences, animals, mental illness, poverty, marriage, race, bias, and victim blaming. Collectively, the essays form the definitive survey of contemporary moral psychology.

What We Owe to Each Other

How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism. Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong.

Happiness, Morality, and Freedom

To be happy is to be satisfied with one's life according to a standard that one can claim as a reasonable being. Being moral and being held morally responsible are shown to be essential to being happy in this sense.

A Companion to Free Will

Provides a comprehensive, cutting-edge, and accessible accompaniment to various narratives about free will A Companion to Free Will is an indispensable resource for anyone interested in the philosophy of free will, offering an authoritative survey of perennial issues and contemporary debates within the field. Bringing together the work of a diverse team of established and younger scholars, this well-balanced volume offers innovative perspectives and fresh approaches to the classical compatibility

problem, moral and legal responsibility, consciousness in free action, action theory, determinism, logical fatalism, impossibilism, and much more. The Companion's 30 chapters provide general coverage of the discipline as well as an in-depth exploration of both CAP (Classical Analytic Paradigm) and non-CAP perspectives on the problem of free will and the problem of determinism—raising new questions about what the free will debate is, or should be, about. Throughout the book, coverage of modern exchanges between the world's leading philosophers is complemented by incisive commentary, novel insights, and selections that examine compatibilist, libertarian, and denialist viewpoints. Offers a balanced presentation of conflicting theories and ongoing debates about the nature, existence, and implications of free will Explores the role of scientific advances and empirical methods in contributing to discourses on free will and action theory Reviews new developments in longstanding arguments between compatibilist and incompatibilist approaches to free will including those that question this way of framing the debate and critique the standard terminology Discusses descriptive, revisionary, and pragmatic approaches for defining key concepts and addressing compatibility problems surrounding free will Considers various issues of moral responsibility and philosophical approaches to the problem of free will in new ways Part of the acclaimed Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, *A Companion to Free Will* is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students of philosophy, professional philosophers and theorists, and interested novices alike.

Motivational Internalism

Motivational internalism - the thesis that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation - is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. This volume helps readers to appreciate the state of the art of research on internalism, to see connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen the discussion of a number of central aspects.

The Moral Nexus

The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms. The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.

Wrongs and Crimes

The Criminalization series arose from an interdisciplinary investigation into criminalization, focussing on the principles that might guide decisions about what kinds of conduct should be criminalized, and the forms that criminalization should take. Developing a normative theory of criminalization, the series tackles the key questions at the heart of the issue: what principles and goals should guide legislators in deciding what to criminalize? How should criminal wrongs be classified and differentiated? How should law enforcement officials apply the law's specifications of offences? The sixth volume in the series offers a philosophical investigation of the relationship between moral wrongdoing and criminalization. Considering the justification of punishment, the nature of harm, the importance of autonomy, inchoate wrongdoing, the role of consent, and the role of the state, the book provides an account of the nature of moral wrongdoing, the sources of wrongdoing, why wrongdoing is the central target of the criminal law, and the ways in which criminalization of non-wrongful conduct might be permissible.

Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions

Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions provides an account of how we might effectively address wrongdoing given challenges to the legitimacy of anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. The issue is introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 asks how we might conceive of blame without retribution, and proposes an account of blame as moral protest, whose function is to secure forward-looking goals such as the moral reform of the wrongdoer and reconciliation in relationships. Chapter 3 considers whether it's possible to justify effectively dealing those who pose dangerous threats if they do not deserve to be harmed, and contends that wrongfully posing a threat is the core condition for the legitimacy of defensive harming. Chapter 4 provides an account of how to treat criminals without a retributive justification for punishment, and argues for an account in which the right of self-defense provides justification for measures such as preventative detention. Chapter 5 considers how we might forgive if wrongdoers don't basically deserve the pain of being resented, which forgiveness would then renounce, and proposes that forgiveness be conceived instead as renunciation of the stance of moral protest. Chapter 6 considers how personal relationships might function without retributive anger having a role in responding to wrongdoing, and contends that the stance of moral protest, supplemented with non-retributive emotions, is sufficient. Chapter 7 surveys the options for theistic and atheistic attitudes regarding the fate of humanity in a deterministic universe, and defends an impartial hope for humanity.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law

The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Law provides a comprehensive, non-technical philosophical treatment of the fundamental questions about the nature of law. Its coverage includes law's relation to morality and the moral obligations to obey the law, the main philosophical debates about particular legal areas such as criminal responsibility, property, contracts, family law, law and justice in the international domain, legal paternalism and the rule of law. The entirely new content has been written specifically for newcomers to the field, making the volume particularly useful for undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of law and related areas. All 39 chapters, written by the world's leading researchers and edited by an internationally distinguished scholar, bring a focused, philosophical perspective to their subjects. The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Law promises to be a valuable and much consulted student resource for many years.

What We Owe to Future People

What do we owe future people? Intergenerational ethics is of great philosophical and practical importance, given human beings' ability to affect not only the quality of life of future people, but also how many of them there will be (if any at all). This book develops a distinctly contractualist answer to this question--we need to justify our actions to them on grounds they could not reasonably reject. The book explores what future people could or could not reasonably reject in terms of intergenerational resource distribution, individual procreative decisions, optimal population size, and risk imposition.

The Difficulty of Tolerance

This volume presents Scanlon's classic essays in political philosophy written between 1969 and 1999.

Ways to be Blameworthy

There must be some connection between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. Yet traditional approaches to each set of concepts tend to take the other set for granted. This book takes an integrated approach to these questions, drawing on both ethics and responsibility theory, and thereby illuminating both sets of concepts. Elinor Mason describes this as 'normative responsibility theory': the primary aim is not to give an account of the conditions of agency, but to give an account of what sort of wrong action makes blame fitting. She presents a pluralistic view of both obligation and blameworthiness, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy, corresponding to different ways of acting wrongly. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective wrongness, to acting wrongly by one's own lights. Subjective obligation, and ordinary blame, apply only to those who are within our moral community, who understand and share our value system. By contrast, detached blame can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. In detached blame, the blame rather than the blameworthiness is fundamental. Finally, agents can take responsibility for some inadvertent wrongs, and thus become responsible. This third sort of blameworthiness, 'extended blameworthiness', applies when the agent understands the objective wrongness of her act, but has no bad will. In such

cases, the social context may be such that the agent should take responsibility, and accept ordinary blame from the wronged party.

Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility

New essays by leading moral philosophers on the nature and ethics of self-blame, and its connections to moral responsibility.

The Problem of Blame

Explores the problem of blame in moral philosophy, setting out a new theory of blame, free will, and moral responsibility.

The Nature of Desire

Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise of the good even right to assume? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire's deontic nature? What do neuroscientific studies suggest? Essays in the first section of the volume are devoted to these questions, and to the puzzle of desire's essence. In the second part of the volume, essays investigate some implications that the various conceptions of desire have on a number of fundamental issues. For example, why are inconsistent desires problematic? What is desire's role in practical deliberation? How do we know what we want? This volume will contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on a neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind.

Philosophers of Our Times

Eighteen of the world's most eminent philosophers of recent years tackle central questions of philosophy. They discuss mind, morality, freedom, identity, religion, politics, and philosophy itself. This anthology of lectures from the Royal Institute of Philosophy offers a fascinating sampler of philosophy at its best.

Time and the Philosophy of Action

Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency, a role with great significance for the study of action. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing an overview of the central developments in each area with an emphasis on the role of temporality. Including contributions by established, rising, and new voices in the field, *Time and the Philosophy of Action* brings analytic work in philosophy of action together with contributions from continental philosophy and cognitive science to elaborate the central thesis that agency not only develops in time but is shaped by it at every level.

Desire as Belief

What is it to want something? Or, as philosophers might ask, what is a desire? The idea that we explain and evaluate actions with essential reference to what people want is compelling, as it speaks to common-sense ideas that our wants lie at the heart of our decision-making. Yet our wants seem to have a competitor: our beliefs about what we ought to do. Such normative beliefs alone may often suffice to explain our actions. To try and resolve this tension, this book defends "desire as belief".

Contemporary Epistemology

A rigorous, authoritative new anthology which brings together some of the most significant contemporary scholarship on the theory of knowledge. Carefully-calibrated and judiciously-curated, this strong and contemporary new anthology builds upon *Epistemology: An Anthology, Second Edition* (Wiley Blackwell, 2008) by drawing a concise and well-balanced selection of higher-level readings

from a large, diverse, and evolving body of research. Includes 17 readings that represent a broad and vital part of contemporary epistemology, including articles by female philosophers and emerging thought leaders Organized into seven thoughtful and distinct sections, including virtue epistemology, practical reasons for belief, and epistemic dysfunctions among others Designed to sit alongside the highly-successful anthology of canonical essays, *Epistemology: An Anthology*, Second Edition (Wiley Blackwell, 2008) Edited by a distinguished editorial team, including Ernie Sosa, one of the most influential active epistemologists Highlights cutting edge methodologies and contemporary topics for advanced students, instructors, and researchers

Getting Things Right

Some of our attitudes are fitting, others unfitting. It seems fitting to admire Mandela, but not Idi Amin, and to believe that the Seine flows through Paris, but not that the Thames does. Fitting attitudes get things right. Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that fittingness is the key to understanding the normative domain—the domain of reasons, obligations, and value. They develop and defend a novel 'fittingness first' approach, on which fittingness is a normatively basic property and all other normative properties depend on fittingness. They show how this approach illuminates central questions in ethics and epistemology.

The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity

'The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity' contains 44 commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics, and will appeal to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question, and provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such "metanormative" issues, bridging subfields as they do so. --

The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment

This Handbook provides a comprehensive survey of major topics in the philosophy of punishment from many of the field's leading scholars. Key features Presents a history of punishment theory from ancient times to the present. Evaluates the main proposed justifications of punishment, including retributivism, general and specific deterrence theories, mixed theories, expressivism, societal-defense theory, fair play theory, rights forfeiture theory, and the public health-quarantine model. Discusses sentencing, proportionality, policing, prosecution, and the role punishment plays in the context of the state. Examines advances in neuroscience and debates about whether free will skepticism undermines the justifiability of punishment. Considers forgiveness, restorative justice, and calls to abolish punishment. Addresses pressing social issues such as mass incarceration, juvenile justice, punitive torture, the death penalty, and "cruel and unusual" punishment. · With its unmatched breadth and depth, this book is essential reading for scholars who want to keep abreast of the field and for advanced students wishing to explore the frontiers of the subject.

A Non-instrumentalist Approach to Collective Intentionality, Practical Reason, and the Self

English summary: Taking into account the relevant and mostly contemporary anglo-american debates concerning collective intentionality, the author examines what it means to share reasons and other intentional states such as thoughts and emotions. The guiding question of the dissertation is in what way and to what extent morality and therefore self-consciousness can be understood as conditions of possibility for the sharing of mental states, especially reasons. The dissertation is a contribution mainly to fields of research in practical philosophy (normative ethics and moral psychology) and in social philosophy (collective intentionality analysis) and rational choice theory. German description: Juliette Gloers Monographie fragt aus hauptsächlich analytischer Perspektive und unter spezieller Berücksichtigung der einschlägigen anglo-amerikanischen Debatten, was es bedeutet, Gründe und andere intentionale Einstellungen zu teilen. Die Leitfrage der Untersuchung lautet, inwiefern Moral und damit Selbstbewusstsein als Bedingungen der Möglichkeit solchen Teilens begriffen werden können. Die Dissertation ist ein Beitrag zur Forschung innerhalb des Gebiets der Praktischen Philosophie

(insbesondere der normativen Ethik) und der Sozialphilosophie (speziell im Bereich der Kollektiven Intentionalität).

Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage

Major scholars assess G. A. Cohen's contribution to the debate on the nature of egalitarian justice.

The Limits of Blame

Faith in the power and righteousness of retribution has taken over the American criminal justice system. Approaching punishment and responsibility from a philosophical perspective, Erin Kelly challenges the moralism behind harsh treatment of criminal offenders and calls into question our society's commitment to mass incarceration.

Instrumental Rationality

Rationality requires that we intend the means that we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. Instrumental Rationality explores the formulation and status of this requirement of means-ends coherence. In particular, it is concerned with understanding what means-ends coherence requires of us as believers and agents, and why. Means-ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. Nor is means-ends coherence strongly normative, such that we always ought to be means-ends coherent. A promising strategy for assessing why this requirement should exist is to consider the constitutive aim of intention. Just as belief has a constitutive aim (truth) that can explain some of the theoretical requirements of consistency and coherence governing beliefs, intention has a constitutive aim (here called "controlled action") that can explain some of the requirements of consistency and coherence governing intentions. We can therefore better understand means-ends coherence by understanding the constitutive aims of both of the attitudes governed by the requirement, intention, and belief.

Current Controversies in Bioethics

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Contributors -- Bioethics: Current Controversies -- Part I Research Ethics: How Should We Justify Ancillary-Care Duties? -- 1 Locating Medical Researchers' Ancillary-Care Obligations within the Division of Moral Labor -- 2 The Grounds of Ancillary Care Duties -- Suggested Further Readings (Part I) -- Study Questions (Part I) -- Part II Clinical Ethics: Are Psychopaths Morally Accountable? -- 3 Fine Cuts of Moral Agency: Dissociable Deficits in Psychopathy and Autism -- 4 Holding Psychopaths Responsible and the Guise of the Good -- Suggested Further Readings (Part II) -- Study Questions (Part II) -- Part III Reproductive Ethics: Is There a Solution to the Nonidentity Problem? -- 5 Dividing and Conquering the Nonidentity Problem -- 6 The Nonidentity Problem: United and Unconquered -- Suggested Further Readings (Part III) -- Study Questions (Part III) -- Part IV Neuroethics: What Is Addiction and Does It Excuse? -- 7 Addiction, Habits, and Blame -- 8 How Addicts Lose Control -- Suggested Further Readings (Part IV) -- Study Questions (Part IV) -- Part V Public Health Ethics: Is Luck Egalitarianism Implausibly Harsh? -- 9 Rarely Harsh and Always Fair: Luck Egalitarianism and Unhealthy Choices -- 10 Luck Egalitarianism, Harshness, and the Rule of Rescue -- Suggested Further Readings (Part V) -- Study Questions (Part V) -- Supplemental Guide to Further Controversies -- Index

Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency

A collection of new essays on the interplay between intentions and practical reasons in law and practical agency.

Rights and Demands

Margaret Gilbert presents the first full-length treatment of a central class of rights: demand-rights. To have such a right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action of another person. Gilbert argues that joint commitment is a ground of demand-rights, and gives joint commitment accounts of both agreements and promises. [Source : éditeur].

Morality and Socially Constructed Norms

Observe social distancing. Tip your waiter. Give priority to the elderly. Stop at the red light. Pay your taxes. Do not chew with your mouth open. These are imperatives we face every day, imposed upon us by norms that happen to be generally accepted in our environment. Call these 'socially constructed norms'. A constant presence in our lives, these norms elicit mixed feelings. On the one hand, we treat them as valid standards of behaviour and respond to their violation with emotions such as disapproval, resentment, and guilt. On the other hand, we look at them with suspicion: after all, they are arbitrary human constructs that may contribute to oppression and injustice. In light of this ambivalence, it is important to have a criterion telling us when, if ever, we are morally bound by socially constructed norms and when we should instead disregard them. *Morality and Socially Constructed Norms* systematically develops such a criterion. It traces the moral significance of those norms to the agential commitments that underpin them, and explains why those commitments ought to be respected, provided the content of the corresponding norms is consistent with independent moral constraints. The book then explores the implications of this view for three core questions in moral, legal, and political philosophy: the grounding of moral rights, the obligation to obey the law, and the wrong of sovereignty violations. *Morality and Socially Constructed Norms* shows how much progress can be made in normative theorizing when we give socially constructed norms their (moral) due.

Rational and Social Agency

Michael Bratman's work has been unusually influential, with significance in disciplines as diverse as philosophy, computer science, law, and primatology. This is a collection of critical essays by some of contemporary philosophy's most distinguished figures, with an editorial introduction situating Bratman's work and its broader significance. The essays in this volume engage with ideas and themes prominent in Bratman's work. The volume also includes a lengthy reply by Bratman, which breaks new ground and deepens our understanding of the nature of action, rationality, and social agency.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 6

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy

This edited collection focuses on the moral and social dimensions of ignorance—an undertheorized category in analytic philosophy. Contributors address such issues as the relation between ignorance and deception, ignorance as a moral excuse, ignorance as a legal excuse, and the relation between ignorance and moral character. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse; some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character; and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Ignorance has certain social dimensions as well: it has been claimed to be the engine of science; it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy; and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. Together, these contributions provide a sustained inquiry into the nature of ignorance and the pivotal role it plays in the moral and social domains.

The Normativity of Rationality

Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. The Normativity of Rationality is concerned with the question of whether we ought to avoid such irrationality. Benjamin Kiesewetter defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativity, such as the form and the content of rational requirements, the preconditions of criticism, and the function of reasons in deliberation and advice. Drawing on an extensive and careful assessment of the problems discussed in the literature, Kiesewetter provides a detailed defence of a reason-response conception of rationality, a novel, evidence-relative account of reasons, and an explanation of structural irrationality in terms of these accounts.

Evidence and Agency

The author explores how we should take evidence into account when thinking about future actions, such as resolving to do something we know will be difficult. Should we believe we will follow through, or not? He argues that if it is important to us, we can rationally believe we will do it, even if our belief contradicts the evidence.