

The Army Capstone Concept

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The Army Capstone Concept serves as a foundational document outlining the U.S. Army's strategic vision for future operations. This vital military strategy guides force development, doctrine, and capability investments to ensure the Army remains prepared for evolving global challenges and maintains overmatch in complex security environments.

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The Army Capstone Concept

The purpose of TRADOC Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept, Operational Adaptability-Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, is to describe the broad capabilities the Army will require in the 2016- 2028 timeframe. It describes how the Army will apply available resources to overcome adaptive enemies and accomplish challenging missions in complex operational environments. The evolving operational environment and emerging threats to national security will require continuous assessment of Army modernization. Effective modernization efforts include change across the domains of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Capabilities, when validated and prioritized, will drive the adaptation and innovation necessary to conduct operations consistent with the ideas in the Army Capstone Concept (ACC). The ACC also establishes the foundation for subordinate concepts that will refine capabilities and identify others essential to ensuring Army combat effectiveness against the full spectrum of threats that the Army, as part of the joint force, is likely to confront in the future.

Military Operations

Ideas matter. Emerging from specific human, historical, and technological contexts, ideas affect understanding and influence behavior. Ideas can serve as the driving force behind significant institutional change. Because the need for change will always be with us, the exchange of ideas and conceptual development must be among our top priorities. The purpose of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept Operational Adaptability-Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, is to describe the broad capabilities the Army will require in 2016-2028. It provides a guide to how the Army will apply available resources to overcome adaptive enemies and accomplish challenging missions. TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 articulates how to think about future armed conflict within an uncertain and complex environment. It provides a foundation for a campaign of learning and analysis that will evaluate and refine the concept's major ideas and required capabilities. Ultimately, prioritized capabilities that emerge from this concept and subordinate, more detailed concepts will guide changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development

and programs related to the human dimension for our Army. The aim of Army operations is to set conditions that achieve or facilitate the achievement of policy goals and objectives. Future enemies will constantly adapt and seek ways to overcome Army strengths and capitalize on what they perceive as our vulnerabilities. We operate where our enemies, indigenous populations, culture, politics, and religion intersect and where the fog and friction of war persists. The U.S. Army must maintain its core competency of conducting effective combined arms operations in close combat to employ defeat and stability mechanisms against a variety of threats. The U.S. Army must also hone its ability to integrate joint and interagency assets, develop the situation through action, and adjust rapidly to changing situations to achieve what this concept defines as operational adaptability. Operational adaptability requires a mindset based on flexibility of thought calling for leaders at all levels who are comfortable with collaborative planning and decentralized execution, have a tolerance for ambiguity, and possess the ability and willingness to make rapid adjustments according to the situation. Operational adaptability is essential to developing situational understanding and seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative under a broad range of conditions. Operational adaptability is also critical to developing the coercive and persuasive skills the Army will need to assist friends, reassure and protect populations, and to identify, isolate, and defeat enemies. Although the Army must continue to develop technology to meet future challenges, we must emphasize the integration of technology into capable formations commanded by innovative leaders who are comfortable operating under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty. To maximize the potential of technological developments, we must conscientiously evolve and adapt capabilities based on changes in threat capabilities and the operational environment.

The US. Army Capstone Concept

As the lead document of the Army Concept Framework, the Army Capstone Concept (ACC) describes the Army's vision of the future operational environment, the role of the Army in the joint force, and the broad capabilities required by future Army forces. Greater speed, quantity, and reach of human interaction and increased access to military capabilities make the operational environment more unpredictable and complex, driving the likelihood and consequence of disorder. The ACC provides a guide to how the Army will apply available resources to overcome these challenges and prevent, shape and win in support of recent strategic guidance. It also serves as the foundation for a campaign of learning that will evaluate and refine its major ideas and required capabilities. Finally, it provides a road map for development of a comprehensive investment strategy that will rebalance the Army's force structure, readiness, and modernization efforts in support of national strategy. This is a print on demand report.

The Army Capstone Concept and Institutional Adaptation

Today's operational environment is increasingly complex, with an ever-expanding array of threats. Within this environment, four trends emerge: growing uncertainty, accelerating change, increased competitiveness and greater decentralization. These trends reflect a future in which the Army is compelled to rapidly adapt in order to defeat new unforeseen threats as they present themselves in unexpected ways. Our challenge then is to build an Army whose leaders and soldiers are comfortable with change and can rapidly adapt themselves, their units and even the institutions as a whole to prevail in the future.

Tradoc Pam 525-3-0 the U.S. Army Capstone Concept 19 December 2012

TP 525-3-0 describes what the future Army must do as part of the joint force to achieve the Nation's strategic objectives. This description is predicated on the Army's enduring missions and the future operational environment, characterized by an era of fiscal constraint. TP 525-3-0 describes the required capabilities the future Army will need to enable the nation to prevent conflict, shape the environment, and win the Nation's wars.

Tp525-3-0 Tradoc Pam 525-3-0 the U.S. Army Capstone Concept 19 December 2012

TP525-3-0 TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 The U.S. Army Capstone Concept 19 December 2012 TP525-3-0 describes what the future Army must do as part of the joint force to achieve the Nation's strategic objectives. This description is predicated on the Army's enduring missions and the future operational environment, characterized by an era of fiscal constraint. TP525-3-0 describes the required capabilities the future Army will need to enable the nation to prevent conflict, shape the environment, and win the Nation's wars.

The Army in Joint Operations: The Army's Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024

BG(P) David Fastbend from the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's Futures Center presents an overview of the logic underpinning The Army in Joint Operations, The Army's Future Capstone Concept 2015-2024 (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0).

Tradoc Pam 525-8-5 U.s. Army Functional Concept for Engagement 24 February 2014

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5 The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, expands on the ideas presented in TP 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept (ACC), and TP 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC), and introduces a new warfighting function. The complexity and uncertainty in the global environment means the Army must become more agile, flexible, and well-prepared to tackle a broad range of operations through the development of innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve U.S. security objectives. The Army also must possess a broad range of capabilities to shape future operational environments, maintain its lethality on the battlefield, and be able to leverage unified action partners to reduce demands, prevent, and end conflict. The engagement warfighting function will institutionalize into Army doctrine, training, education, and leader development, the capabilities and skills necessary to work with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner that allows bridging language barriers, opening lines of communication and connections with key political and military leaders in a way that is both immediate and lasting. It enhances interdependence between special operations forces, conventional forces, and unified action partners while incorporating the tenets of the emerging idea of the human domain. As a result, this warfighting function will contribute to mission accomplishment by providing better, more synchronized lethal and nonlethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter, and influence the decisions and behavior of a nation's security forces, government, and people. TP 525-8-5 effectively complements the six other warfighting functions and is fully nested in the broad vision outlined in both the ACC and AOC. This concept will lead force development and modernization efforts by establishing a common framework to capitalize on the integrative opportunities all of the warfighting functions provide to future land operations.

Tradoc Pamphlet 525-3-3 the U.s. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-3, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command (AFC-MC), expands on the Army's overarching leadership philosophy presented in TP 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept and TP 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World (AOC). The AFC-MC refines the mission command warfighting function to emphasize the need for Army forces to operate across multiple domains and as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams.

To Be a Soldier

To Be a Soldier offers the US Army's two capstone doctrinal manuals in one place for the first time. This guide begins with the Army's introductory text, FM-1 The Army, which explains the Army's origin and purpose, its mission and values, how it functions as a portion of a joint military force in combat, and the importance of the individual soldier in a larger fighting force. When readers have learned the fundamentals of the Army, FM-3 Operations provides foundational knowledge of the full spectrum of Army operations. This manual is the Army's principal tool for the instruction of today's soldiers in the art and science of warfare, and has been recently updated to discuss counter-insurgency and hybrid threats in addition to conventional land operations. To Be a Soldier is the reader's guide to the Army's most fundamental knowledge by offering its two capstone texts in one place. The information in this handbook forms the basis for all the knowledge conveyed in any subsequent Army field manuals, making it required reading for all soldiers and readers with interest in US Army training and operations.

Military Operations

Emerging joint and Army concepts highlight the fact that the future Modular Force battlefield now extends vertically into space. Additionally, the complexity of joint and combined arms operations described in our joint and Army concepts place high demands on future Modular Force commanders and organizations. The global explosion in military and commercial space-based information technologies present an opportunity to integrate space throughout the force enabling the type of warfare envisioned in our future Force concepts. Within this context the Army has a responsibility to influence and shape the design and development of the space related requirements of the future Modular Force. The U.S. Army Space Operations Concept Capability Plan (CCP) identifies the space-enabled capabilities required to execute Army operations in the 2015 - 2024 timeframe. The CCP describes how Army forces leverage the power of national, civil and commercial space-based assets on the future battlefield. The capabilities identified in this CCP provide a coherent way ahead for the further examination of potential doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions. As such, this CCP will serve as a start point for a comprehensive capabilities based assessment involving many different proponents. In examining Army's future space-enabled capabilities, the CCP describes the environment of space, the emerging threat from our adversaries use of space for hostile purposes, and the joint interdependence of all space operations. The CCP describes how the Army will evolve from a position of simply exploiting strategic space-based capabilities to a position where the Army is fully integrated into the planning, execution, and use of theater focused operational and tactical space applications. The realization of these capabilities is essential to achieving the Army's Capstone Concept objective of becoming a strategically responsive, campaign quality force. As with all concepts, concept capability plans are in continuous evolution. This CCP will be refined and updated as new learning emerges from research, joint and Army wargaming, experimentation and combat development. Many of the space-enabled capability requirements introduced in this CCP will be further developed in other proponent capability documents. Because this CCP crosses so many joint and Army functional areas, I strongly encourage its use in our interaction with other proponents, Services and joint organizations.

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations describes in broad terms my vision for how the joint force circa 2016-2028 will operate in response to a wide variety of security challenges. It proposes that future joint force commanders will combine and subsequently adapt some combination of four basic categories of military activity -- combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction -- in accordance with the unique requirements of each operational situation. The concept is informed by current strategic guidance, but because it looks to the future, it is intended to be adaptable, as it must be, to changes in that guidance.

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

Evolving joint and Army concepts indicate that the future Modular Force will operate as part of a joint or multinational force. Future forces will operate across the spectrum of conflict on a global battlefield involving simultaneous regionally focused operations. These operations will take place in an increasingly complex electromagnetic environment, where both technical military capabilities and commercial off the shelf technology are being used to support military operations at an unprecedented rate. To operate

unimpeded in the complex electromagnetic environment, the future Modular Force requires electronic warfare capabilities. The U.S. Army Concept Capability Plan for Army Electronic Warfare Operations for the Future Modular Force 2015-2024 outlines electronic warfare (EW) operations. It identifies the EW capabilities required to execute Army operations in a joint environment during the 2015- 2024 timeframe. The capabilities identified in the concept capability plan (CCP) provide a coherent means of examining potential doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions. This CCP will therefore serve as the basis for a comprehensive capabilities based assessment involving many different proponents. In examining the Army's future EW requirements and capabilities, the CCP describes the integration of EW capabilities in support of the seven key ideas articulated in the Army's capstone concept. These EW capabilities when applied across the warfighting functions will provide future Modular Force commanders the capabilities required to address the potential enemy EW threats within the joint operational environment out to 2024. The CCP describes the need for improved EW platforms and systems and how Army forces will leverage joint, Service, interagency, commercial, and multinational capabilities to assist in providing EW support to full spectrum operations. The CCP acknowledges that EW has a substantial joint dimension and therefore draws from the relevant joint concepts. As with all concepts, CCPs are continuously evolving. This CCP will be refined and updated as new ideas and technologies emerge and as the capabilities introduced in this document are integrated. This CCP has applicability to many joint and Army functional areas and I recommend it to you when engaging other joint organizations, Services, and proponents.

Military Operations

As the United States Army stands in the midst of a transitional period, it must determine what type of Army it will be. In doing so, the Army must come to grips with new realities of the strategic context that demand a capability to use "Engagement" as defined in the National Security Strategy and an inculcation of "Operational adaptability" as defined in the Army Capstone Concept. Recently, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) proposed a change to Army doctrine that would have made Special Operations a seventh warfighting function for the Army. The proposal failed to pass and the Army is now taking a much slower approach to changes. This monograph uses this failed proposal as a singular case study, or micro-event that illuminates a macro-phenomenon, which could be preventing the Army from meeting its challenges of engagement and operational adaptability. Using key elements of organization theory as a lens for understanding why the proposal failed, this monograph applies process tracing and argument mapping. It demonstrates that the fragmented organizational sub-culture of SOF may have influenced not only the failure of the proposal, but also continues to prevent the Army from leveraging the institutional strength of the SOF community toward engagement and operational adaptability.

Operational Art and the Clash of Organizational Cultures: Postmortem on Special Operations As a Seventh Warfighting Function

Functional Concept for Intelligence, 2016-2028, describes what the Army must do to develop forces capable of conducting intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination in support of commanders and facilitate understanding of the operational environment, the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations in support of military operations. It serves as a foundation for future force development pertaining to intelligence and the intelligence warfighting function. In addition to the warfighting challenges of the future, the Army also faces a number of institutional challenges. The rapid pace of technological change, prolonged acquisition timelines, and growing resource constraints make it necessary for the Army to adopt a more responsive approach to capabilities development. Accordingly, TRADOC is shifting from a 5-year to a 2-year cycle for concept development and revision. As a result, the Army Capabilities Integration Center will update and revise the entire Army Concept Framework every 2 years. This significant change will enable more effective input into the major budget and programming decisions across our Army. Chapter 1 * Introduction * 1-1. Purpose * 1-2. Background * 1-3. The operational environment * 1-4. The intelligence warfighting function * 1-5. Assumptions * 1-6. Linkage to the Army capstone concept * 1-7. Linkage to the AOC * 1-8. Linkage to the human dimension * 1-9. References * 1-10. Explanations of abbreviations and terms * Chapter 2 * Military Problem and Components of the Solution * 2-1. Military problem * 2-2. Solution synopsis * 2-3. Future force Army intelligence components of the solution * Chapter 3 * Core Operational Actions * 3-1. Introduction * 3-2. Conduct security force assistance * 3-3. Shaping and entry operations * 3-4. Intertheater and intratheater operational maneuver * 3-5. Full-spectrum operations * 3-6. Conduct overlapping protection operations * 3-7. Distributed support and sustainment * 3-8. Network-enabled mission command *

Chapter 4 * Conclusion * 4-1. Summary * 4-2. Closing * Appendix A * References * Section I * Required Publications * Section II * Related Publications * Appendix B * Required Capabilities * B-1. ACC intelligence required capabilities * B-2. AOC intelligence required capabilities * B-3. First order required capabilities (what intelligence needs to do) * B-4. Second order: what intelligence needs from other warfighting functions * B-5. Other warfighting function dependencies on intelligence * B-6. Required capabilities to support rule of law outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) * B-7. Support to IO required capabilities * B-8. Support to cyber operations required capabilities * B-9. Support to combating WMD required capabilities * Appendix C * Intelligence Echelons * C-1. Intelligence community * C-2. Division and above intelligence organizations * C-3. Army intelligence capabilities brigade and below * Appendix D * ARSOF Intelligence * D-1. Introduction * D-2. Intelligence structure * D-3. Military problem and intelligence * D-4. ARSOF lines of effort * D-5. ARSOF intelligence required capabilities and dependencies * Appendix E * Homeland Defense and Civil Support Intelligence * E-1. Introduction * E-2. Background * E-3. Operational Environment * E-4. Integrated theater Army intelligence enterprise mission * E-5. Concept of operations * E-6. Required capabilities * Appendix F * Intelligence Future DOTMLPF Considerations * F-1. Introduction * F-2. Doctrine * F-3. Organizational * F-4. Training * F-5. Materiel * F-6. Leadership and education * F-7. Personnel * F-8. Facilities * F-9. Homeland defense and civil support * F-10. Intelligence sharing * Glossary * Section I * Abbreviations * Section II * Terms * Section III * Special Terms As a bonus, this reproduction includes the complete 2012 Army Leadership manual (FM 6-22).

21st Century U.S. Military Manuals

Current Secretary of Defense guidance to the armed services is to develop a strategically balanced Joint force capable of spanning the full spectrum of conflict. This concept is driven by acknowledgment that predicting every threat is unrealistic and promotes the idea that the best security approach is a flexible force capable of responding to a broad range of threats. The Army's Capstone Concept to support the Joint intent is development of a force that is not optimized towards specific threats but depends on rapid adaptability to threats as they are revealed. As envisioned, the Army's concept demands debate on the risk and affordability implications of this approach to strategic balance. This paper addresses a risk-based approach to balance the Army that assesses alternative postures and addresses the viability of balanced force concepts in mitigating national risk in a resource constrained environment. This assessment also examines alternate definitions and definitional implications of balance and the continued relevance of conventional capabilities and nuclear deterrence to a balanced force posture

Integrated Capstone Concept

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Though national strategic guidance does not specify the need for the United States Army to maintain an amphibious capability, joint doctrine does task the Army with providing landing forces as part of larger, joint amphibious operations. This doctrine, when coupled with the Joint Staff's Joint Operational Access Concept, that outlines the means by which U.S. forces project power to defeat aggression in the face of increasingly complex anti-access and area-denial weapons and technologies, the so-called "pivot" to the Pacific, and shortfalls in existing joint amphibious capacity, suggests that the Army is in need of an amphibious capability. This study assesses this need in light of anticipated amphibious requirements, the Army's historical role in amphibious operations, and an analysis of Army doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership/education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to identify capability gaps that the Army would need to address in order to fulfill its role in Joint amphibious operations. Throughout the history of the United States, the Army has repeated a cycle of attaining proficiency in a particular type of warfare and then ignoring those capabilities in favor of general forms of warfare, only to have to relearn these special skills during a future conflict-sometimes at a cost of thousands of American casualties. The US Army learned and conducted trench warfare during the American Civil War, but then neglected it from 1865-1917, paying the cost in human life on the battlefields of World War I while trying to reacquire a skill it once possessed. Counterinsurgency operations honed in Vietnam but ignored in the 1980s and 1990s, later rose to prominence in the villages of Afghanistan and the streets of Iraq. Before World War II the Army developed a robust amphibious capability consisting of a two-star Amphibious Training Center, large quantities of equipment capable of supporting amphibious operations, and units with amphibious operational experience. The Army's invaluable amphibious capability has atrophied since World War II to the point that almost zero capability exists today within the Army. This monograph proposes that

an amphibious capability gap currently exists within the Army as part of a larger Joint Force and when the Joint Force calls upon the Army to conduct amphibious operations, it will be unable to do so. Any need for the Army to possess an amphibious capability would, of course, only exist if such a requirement was anticipated within the future operational environment. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 states that the future environment will include characteristics such as the "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of competitor states . . . regional instability . . . and competition for resources."¹ In scenarios where these threats have presented themselves in the recent past, the US has had time to "build up combat power in the area, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conduct operations when and where desired." Anti-access and area denial (A2/AD), the primary emerging threat within the future environment, hinders the US military's ability from operating the way it has in the past. Anti-access and area denial capabilities "challenge and threaten the ability of the U.S. and allied forces to both get to the fight and to fight effectively once there."

A Risk-based Approach to Strategic Balance

ADP 3-0 Operations In 2011 the Army updated its warfighting doctrine to conduct unified land operations executed through decisive action and guided by mission command. ADP 3-0, Operations, is a natural evolution of past capstone doctrine that captured the most critical lessons of almost fifteen years of sustained land combat. In this edition, we not only reflect on the past but also look to the future. This publication builds on the idea that success requires fully integrating Army operations with the efforts of unified action partners. ADP 3-0 provides a common operational concept for Army forces who must be ready to operate across the range of military operations and across multiple domains, integrating their actions with unified action partners as part of a larger effort. Today, Army forces are engaged with more than 140,000 Soldiers in over 150 countries, either conducting combat operations, deterring aggression, or reassuring our allies and partners. The United States Army is also relentlessly hunting terrorists throughout many other parts of the world. We are engaging our partners in Africa and throughout the Americas. Readiness for current and future operations requires a force that is honed through effective training and education and well versed on how our Army conducts operations. The central idea of operations is that, as part of a joint force, Army forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our Nation's wars as part of unified action. ADP 3-0 discusses the principles of unified land operations-mission command, develop the situation through action, combined arms, adhere to the law of war, establish and maintain security, and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. ADP 3-0 incorporates the tenets of unified land operations-simultaneity, depth, synchronization, and flexibility. It highlights the concept that operational art is the connection between strategic objectives and tactical actions, and it supports a common construct for organizing both joint and Army operations. The construct consists of the Army operations process, an operations framework for visualizing and describing operations, and combat power. ADP 3-0 serves as the common operational concept for the Army. The central idea, adapted to the unique conditions of each conflict, represents the Army's unique contribution to unified action. It must permeate our doctrine, our training, and our leader professional development programs.

The Army and the Need for an Amphibious Capability - Role in the Pivot to the Pacific, Defeating Aggression, DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel

The transformation of the Army into a strategically responsive, expeditionary force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations requires significant cultural, doctrinal and organizational change as well as advanced technological solutions. Such changes and technology must support the Army at every point on the spectrum of operations and must be suitable for the current as well as future forces. These changes and technologies must offer far-reaching capabilities that enable the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and the Army's Future Force Capstone Concept. Simply improving existing platforms, doctrine, organizations and Army culture does not support the transformation envisioned in either of the aforementioned conceptual documents. Achieving this robust water transport capability requires new ways and means - enabled by truly transformational doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy. The major shift in Army watercraft operation focuses on our ability to rapidly project and sustain operational forces within and through the littoral areas of the world. Expeditionary units and enabling technologies provide the commander the water transport capability to achieve positional advantage over operational and tactical distances. These water transport assets are not limited to operating in major or minor ports, but can also

operate in austere port environments or over bare beaches. To maximize effectiveness, combat forces must be able to move autonomously, plan and rehearse while en route, and arrive in an immediately employable configuration. Transformation also emphasizes an improved link between operations and logistics, resulting in precise, reliable distributed support and sustainment to the warfighter. Future watercraft, and the units that employ them, must be fast, efficient, and agile; able to move with precision in a quickly changing environment. They must be capable of moving intact current and future force units forward of the strategic port; delivering platforms laden with retail supply; or delivering humanitarian and disaster relief materiel, all the while staying fully aware of the current and future operational situation. Army water transport forces provide the combatant commanders the maneuver capability to rapidly move forces, support and sustainment to the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantities. As the Army transforms, potential adversaries will adopt anti-access strategies. State or non-state forces will rely on anti-access measures to delay or counter the application of U.S. military capabilities. Future adversaries will marshal their limited assets and focus them on the most likely points of entry into the region. Traditionally, these are major air and seaports or major geographical choke points that must be navigated to achieve entry. Joint Force enabling concepts, units and technologies must provide the operational commander lift assets that bypass these known points, diminishing any asymmetrical advantage held by an adversary. They must allow the commander to pick the time and place of their choosing to initiate action and, thereby, to seize and hold the initiative in a tactical environment. Army watercraft and Army soldier-mariners must be fully trained, equipped and capable of operating in this dynamic joint environment.

Adp 3-0 Operations

The Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) was used in Army and Joint combat, stability, and support to civil authority operations for over 50 years. The LCM is the Army's smallest, most practical capability to conduct operational maneuver within the littorals to achieve tactical success, move operationally ready forces by water to austere access points, and rapidly enable sustainment operations via inland waterways. The LCM has exceeded its operational lifecycle and does not meet the Joint Task Force Commanders' required capabilities for waterborne operations. Those requirements include: to carry an M1A2 tank, to maneuver "combat ready" Stryker vehicles, and to rapidly maneuver and deploy combat forces. The Army concept framework together with the Army Transportation Corps' Capability Based Assessment (CBA) of Army watercraft and historical landing craft uses provides a case study into the landing craft capability gap. The Army must decide whether to retain, divest, or pursue a new material landing craft solution that meets the needs of the Joint Task Force Commander.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION * Historical Uses of Army Landing Craft * Landing Craft Requirements Grounded in Doctrine * The Army Landing Craft Fleet * Logistics Support Vessel * Landing Craft Utility 2000 * Landing Craft Mechanized 8 * CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW * The U.S. Army Capstone Concept * The U.S. Army Operating Concept * The Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver * The Functional Concept for Sustainment * Army Water Transport Operations * The Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) * The Army Watercraft Master Plan * Army Transportation Functional Area Analysis (FAA) * Army Watercraft Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) * Army Watercraft Function Solution Analysis (FSA) * Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) Request For Information * How The Army Runs (HTAR), Handbook * The Joint Concept for Entry Operations Vietnam Studies, Riverine Operations 1966-1969 * Operation Just Cause, The Incursion into Panama * The Need for America's Amphibious Capability * CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY * Qualitative Research Method.. Case Study Method * Capability Based Assessment Analysis Model * CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS * Introduction * Common Scenario Requiring the MSV(L) Findings * What capabilities must the Army retain to meet JTF requirements for waterborne operations? * What capabilities exist to fulfill waterborne requirements? * What is the best way for the Army to fulfill waterborne operations capabilities? * CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS * Conclusions * Recommendations * Field a Material Solution * Incorporate Solutions within Doctrine, Policy, Leadership, and Education * Approaches . Recommendations for Further Study

Army Water Transport Operations (ATTP 4-15)

To Be a Soldier offers the US Army's two capstone doctrinal manuals in one place for the first time. This guide begins with the Army's introductory text, FM-1 The Army, which explains the Army's origin and purpose, its mission and values, how it functions as a portion of a joint military force in combat, and the importance of the individual soldier in a larger fighting force. When readers have learned the fundamentals of the Army, FM-3 Operations provides foundational knowledge of the full spectrum of

Army operations. This manual is the Army's principal tool for the instruction of today's soldiers in the art and science of warfare, and has been recently updated to discuss counter-insurgency and hybrid threats in addition to conventional land operations. To Be a Soldier is the reader's guide to the Army's most fundamental knowledge by offering its two capstone texts in one place. The information in this handbook forms the basis for all the knowledge conveyed in any subsequent Army field manuals, making it required reading for all soldiers and readers with interest in US Army training and operations.

Army Training : Long-standing Control Problems Hinder the CAPSTONE Program

On 15 January 2009, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) published his Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, calling it the most fundamental of all US military concepts while signaling an expansion of and shift in focus within in the military domain. Knowledge Centric Warfare, an evolutionary step beyond Network Centric Warfare, provides a conceptual underpinning to propel this fundamental shift in the joint force. Built upon the philosophical position that knowledge is inseparable from the knower, this paper rejects the objectification of knowledge and argues that deliberately developing the private and cultural mental models of the force will achieve the Chairman's vision.

The Need for the United States Army to Possess a Landing Craft with Maneuver Capabilities

This publication, "Army Health System," provides the capstone doctrine for the Army Health System (AHS) in support of the modular force. The Army Health System is the overarching concept of support for providing timely medical support to the tactical commander. It discusses the current medical force structure modernized under the Department of the Army (DA) approved Medical Reengineering Initiative and the Modular Medical Force that is designed to support the brigade combat teams and echelons above brigade units. As the Army's capstone medical doctrine statement, this publication identifies medical functions and procedures that are essential for operations covered in other Army Medical Department (AMEDD) proponent manuals. This publication depicts Army Health System operations from the point of injury, illness, or wounding through successive roles of care within the theater and evacuation to the continental United States (CONUS) support base. It presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience and serves as a foundation for the development of AMEDD proponent manuals on how the AHS supports the modular force. The AHS is a component of the Department of Defense (DOD) Military Health System. It is responsible for the operational management of the health service support (HSS) and force health protection (FHP) missions for training, predeployment, deployment, and post deployment operations. The AHS includes all mission support services performed, provided, or arranged by the AMEDD to support HSS and FHP mission requirements for the Army and as directed, for joint, intergovernmental agencies, and multinational forces. Although Joint doctrine describes the capabilities of the Military Health System as a taxonomy of care, this description does not adequately address how the AMEDD must organize and equip its forces to successfully accomplish the health care delivery in the noncontiguous operational environment. Therefore, the AHS is in consonance with and supports the concept of the taxonomy of care, but AMEDD support is discussed in terms of capability packages specifically designed to support Army formations. Although the Military Health System is an interrelated system which may share medical services, capabilities, and specialties among the Service components, it is not a joint mission command system. Each Service component develops its medical resources to support its Service-specific mission. This results in the development of different types of organizations with varying levels of capability, mobility, and survivability. Although joint medical resources may have similar nomenclature to describe the unit, they are not usually interchangeable.

To Be a Soldier

The transformation of the Army into a strategically responsive, expeditionary force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations requires significant cultural, doctrinal and organizational change as well as advanced technological solutions. Such changes and technology must support the Army at every point on the spectrum of operations and must be suitable for the current as well as future forces. These changes and technologies must offer far-reaching capabilities that enable the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and the Army's Future Force Capstone Concept. Simply improving existing platforms, doctrine, organizations and Army culture does not support the transformation envisioned in either of the aforementioned conceptual documents. Achieving this robust water transport capability requires new ways and means - enabled by truly transformational doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy. The major shift in

Army watercraft operation focuses on our ability to rapidly project and sustain operational forces within and through the littoral areas of the world. Expeditionary units and enabling technologies provide the commander the water transport capability to achieve positional advantage over operational and tactical distances. These water transport assets are not limited to operating in major or minor ports, but can also operate in austere port environments or over bare beaches. To maximize effectiveness, combat forces must be able to move autonomously, plan and rehearse while en route, and arrive in an immediately employable configuration. Transformation also emphasizes an improved link between operations and logistics, resulting in precise, reliable distributed support and sustainment to the warfighter. Future watercraft, and the units that employ them, must be fast, efficient, and agile; able to move with precision in a quickly changing environment. They must be capable of moving intact current and future force units forward of the strategic port; delivering platforms laden with retail supply; or delivering humanitarian and disaster relief materiel, all the while staying fully aware of the current and future operational situation. Army water transport forces provide the combatant commanders the maneuver capability to rapidly move forces, support and sustainment to the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantities. As the Army transforms, potential adversaries will adopt anti-access strategies. State or non-state forces will rely on anti-access measures to delay or counter the application of U.S. military capabilities. Future adversaries will marshal their limited assets and focus them on the most likely points of entry into the region. Traditionally, these are major air and seaports or major geographical choke points that must be navigated to achieve entry. Joint Force enabling concepts, units and technologies must provide the operational commander lift assets that bypass these known points, diminishing any asymmetrical advantage held by an adversary. They must allow the commander to pick the time and place of their choosing to initiate action and, thereby, to seize and hold the initiative in a tactical environment. Army watercraft and Army soldier-mariners must be fully trained, equipped and capable of operating in this dynamic joint environment. Chapters will be updated accordingly as DOD and Army leadership make decisions regarding DOTMLPF and policy that inform further development of ATTP 4-15. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated. Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Training and Doctrine Development Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command.

Knowledge Centric Warfare

This publication provides the capstone doctrine for the Army Health System (AHS) in support of the modular force. The Army Health System is the overarching concept of support for providing timely medical support to the tactical commander. It discusses the current medical force structure modernized under the Department of the Army (DA) approved Medical Reengineering Initiative and the Modular Medical Force that is designed to support the brigade combat teams and echelons above brigade units. As the Army's capstone medical doctrine statement, this publication identifies medical functions and procedures that are essential for operations covered in other Army Medical Department (AMEDD) proponent manuals. This publication depicts Army Health System operations from the point of injury, illness, or wounding through successive roles of care within the theater and evacuation to the continental United States (CONUS) support base. It presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience and serves as a foundation for the development of AMEDD proponent manuals on how the AHS supports the modular force. This publication is for use by commanders and their staffs and command surgeons. It is to be used as a guide in obtaining as well as providing AHS in an area of operations. Information in this publication is applicable to the full spectrum operations. It is compatible with the Army's sustainment and protection doctrine and is in consonance with Joint Publication (JP) 4-02. This publication implements or is in consonance with the following North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), and American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Standards and Quadripartite Advisory Publication 256.

Army Health System (ATTP 4-02)

In September 2012, the Department of the Army published new capstone doctrine, Army Doctrine Publication 1 (ADP 1), The Army, in which the concept of military professionalism occupies an especially prominent place. Coinciding with the release of The Army, the Chief of Staff declared that 2013 features a focus on professionalism; entitled "America's Army-Our Profession," in an effort to better understand the idea of military professionalism. Military history can and should contribute to an understanding

of American military professionalism. Investigating the nature of professionalism in the officer corps serving during President George Washington's administration, the central argument of this study is that early Army leaders demonstrated a particularly American style of military professionalism. The early officer corps grappled with the same elements described by the Army's current doctrine as fundamentally characteristic of military professionalism: trust, expertise, service, esprit and stewardship. Understanding the strengths, weaknesses, challenges, and limitations of the early officer corps' approach to professionalism in light of these five key characteristics provides important background and a useful conceptual framework to more fully understand the American military tradition and today's doctrine concerning military professionalism.

Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures ATTP 4-15 (FM 55-50) Army Water Transport Operations

As entrenched bureaucracies, military organizations might reasonably be expected to be especially resistant to reform and favor only limited, incremental adjustments. Yet, since 1945, the U.S. Army has rewritten its capstone doctrine manual, Operations, fourteen times. While some modifications have been incremental, collectively they reflect a significant evolution in how the Army approaches warfare—making the U.S. Army a crucial and unique case of a modern land power that is capable of change. So what accounts for this anomaly? What institutional processes have professional officers developed over time to escape bureaucracies' iron cage? Forging the Sword conducts a comparative historical process-tracing of doctrinal reform in the U.S. Army. The findings suggest that there are unaccounted-for institutional facilitators of change within military organizations. Thus, it argues that change in military organizations requires "incubators," designated subunits established outside the normal bureaucratic hierarchy, and "advocacy networks" championing new concepts. Incubators, ranging from special study groups to non-Title 10 war games and field exercises, provide a safe space for experimentation and the construction of new operational concepts. Advocacy networks then connect different constituents and inject them with concepts developed in incubators. This injection makes changes elites would have otherwise rejected a contagious narrative.

Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures ATTP 4-02 Army Health System

In September 2012, the Department of the Army published new capstone doctrine, ADP 1, The Army, in which the concept of military professionalism occupies an especially prominent place. Coinciding with the release of The Army, the Chief of Staff declared that 2013 features a focus on professionalism, titled "America's Army-Our Profession," in an effort to better understand the idea of military professionalism. Military history can and should contribute to an understanding of American military professionalism. Investigating the nature of professionalism in the officer corps serving during President George Washington's administration, the central argument of this study is that early Army leaders demonstrated a particularly American style of military professionalism. The early officer corps grappled with the same elements described by the Army's current doctrine as fundamentally characteristic of military professionalism: trust, expertise, service, esprit and stewardship. Understanding the strengths, weaknesses, challenges, and limitations of the early officer corps' approach to professionalism in light of these five key characteristics provides important background and a useful conceptual framework to more fully understand the American military tradition and today's doctrine concerning military professionalism.

Military Professionalism and the Early American Officer Corps 1789-1796

As entrenched bureaucracies, military organizations might reasonably be expected to be especially resistant to reform and favor only limited, incremental adjustments. Yet, since 1945, the U.S. Army has rewritten its capstone doctrine manual, Operations, fourteen times. While some modifications have been incremental, collectively they reflect a significant evolution in how the Army approaches warfare—making the U.S. Army a crucial and unique case of a modern land power that is capable of change. So what accounts for this anomaly? What institutional processes have professional officers developed over time to escape bureaucracies' iron cage? Forging the Sword conducts a comparative historical process-tracing of doctrinal reform in the U.S. Army. The findings suggest that there are unaccounted-for institutional facilitators of change within military organizations. Thus, it argues that change in military organizations requires "incubators," designated subunits established outside the normal bureaucratic hierarchy, and "advocacy networks" championing new concepts. Incubators, ranging from special study groups to non-Title 10 war games and field exercises, provide a safe space for experimentation and the construction of new operational concepts. Advocacy networks then connect

different constituents and inject them with concepts developed in incubators. This injection makes changes elites would have otherwise rejected a contagious narrative.

Forging the Sword

When we published Change 1 to the 2008 edition of (Field Manual) FM 3-0, we captured the most critical lessons of almost ten years of sustained land combat. In this edition, we not only reflect on the past but also look to an uncertain future. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, provides a common operational concept for a future in which Army forces must be prepared to operate across the range of military operations, integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as part of a larger effort. Unified Land Operations is a natural intellectual outgrowth of past capstone doctrine. AirLand battle recognized the three dimensional nature of modern warfare, while full spectrum operations recognized the need to conduct a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously. This publication builds on both these ideas, adding that success requires fully integrating Army operations with the efforts of joint, interagency, and multinational partners. The central idea of Unified Land Operations is that Army units seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations to create conditions for favorable conflict resolution. This central idea applies to all military operations-offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities. This unifying principle connects the various tasks Army forces may perform. It adds the founding principles of flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. It incorporates the principle that operational art is the connection between strategic objectives and tactical actions, and provides a common construct for organizing military operations. The construct consists of the Army operations process, an operations framework for visualizing and describing operations, and the warfighting functions. ADP 3-0 serves as the common operational concept for the Army. The central idea, adapted to the unique conditions of each conflict, represents the Army's unique contribution to unified action. It must permeate our doctrine, our training, and our leader professional development programs.

Military Professionalism and the Early American Officer Corps, 1789-1796

Competent leaders of character are necessary for the Army to meet the challenges in the dangerous and complex security environment we face. As the keystone leadership manual for the United States Army, FM 6-22 establishes leadership doctrine, the fundamental principles by which Army leaders act to accomplish their mission and care for their people. FM 6-22 applies to officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted Soldiers of all Army components, and to Army civilians. From Soldiers in basic training to newly commissioned officers, new leaders learn how to lead with this manual as a basis. FM 6-22 is prepared under the direction of the Army Chief of Staff. It defines leadership, leadership roles and requirements, and how to develop leadership within the Army. It outlines the levels of leadership as direct, organizational, and strategic, and describes how to lead successfully at each level. It establishes and describes the core leader competencies that facilitate focused feedback, education, training, and development across all leadership levels. It reiterates the Army Values. FM 6-22 defines how the Warrior Ethos is an integral part of every Soldier's life. It incorporates the leadership qualities of self-awareness and adaptability and describes their critical impact on acquiring additional knowledge and improving in the core leader competencies while operating in constantly changing operational environments. In line with evolving Army doctrine, FM 6-22 directly supports the Army's capstone manuals, FM 1 and FM 3-0, as well as keystone manuals such as FM 5-0, FM 6-0, and FM 7-0. FM 6-22 connects Army doctrine to joint doctrine as expressed in the relevant joint doctrinal publications, JP 1 and JP 3-0. As outlined in FM 1, the Army uses the shorthand expression of BE-KNOW-DO to concentrate on key factors of leadership. What leaders DO emerges from who they are (BE) and what they KNOW. Leaders are prepared throughout their lifetimes with respect to BE-KNOW-DO so they will be able to act at a moment's notice and provide leadership for whatever challenge they may face. FM 6-22 expands on the principles in FM 1 and describes the character attributes and core competencies required of contemporary leaders. Character is based on the attributes central to a leader's make-up, and competence comes from how character combines with knowledge, skills, and behaviors to result in leadership. Inextricably linked to the inherent qualities of the Army leader, the concept of BE-KNOW-DO represents specified elements of character, knowledge, and behavior described here in FM 6-22.

Forging the Sword

A review of the recently published Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) highlights a complex security environment marked by an ever-changing and easily accessible global information network. Because of this expanding phenomenon, military actions and operations will be conducted under increased media scrutiny and will require greater transparency especially for the international audience. Additionally, U.S. military operations within the Middle East will be widely scrutinized by a global Muslim audience, who has become more distrustful and critical of U.S. policies and military strategy. As such, this necessitates greater engagement with international news networks by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and its military services. In particular, the Al Jazeera Media Network represents one of the fastest growing and most influential news networks among the myriad media who dominate the global information environment. This research highlights the need for the DoD and the Joint Services to examine current communication strategies with the Al Jazeera Media Network and incorporate the findings into its senior leader engagement plan and its leader development strategies for public affairs and communication specialists.

Unified Land Operations

This book, Space Capstone Publication Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, is capstone doctrine for the United States Space Force and represents our Service's first articulation of an independent theory of spacepower. This publication answers why spacepower is vital for our Nation, how military spacepower is employed, who military space forces are, and what military space forces value. In short, this capstone document is the foundation of our professional body of knowledge as we forge an independent military Service committed to space operations. Like all doctrine, the SCP remains subject to the policies and strategies that govern its employment. Military spacepower has deterrent and coercive capacities - it provides independent options for National and Joint leadership but achieves its greatest potential when integrated with other forms of military power. As we grow spacepower theory and doctrine, we must do so in a way that fosters greater integration with the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It is only by achieving true integration and interdependence that we can hope to unlock spacepower's full potential.

Army Leadership

In September 2012, the Department of the Army published new capstone doctrine, ADP 1, The Army, in which the concept of military professionalism occupies an especially prominent place. Coinciding with the release of The Army, the Chief of Staff declared that 2013 features a focus on professionalism, titled "America's Army-Our Profession," in an effort to better understand the idea of military professionalism. Military history can and should contribute to an understanding of American military professionalism. Investigating the nature of professionalism in the officer corps serving during President George Washington's administration, the central argument of this study is that early Army leaders demonstrated a particularly American style of military professionalism. The early officer corps grappled with the same elements described by the Army's current doctrine as fundamentally characteristic of military professionalism: trust, expertise, service, esprit and stewardship. Understanding the strengths, weaknesses, challenges, and limitations of the early officer corps' approach to professionalism in light of these five key characteristics provides important background and a useful conceptual framework to more fully understand the American military tradition and today's doctrine concerning military professionalism.

Al Jazeera and the DoD

FM 1 is one of the Army's two capstone doctrinal manuals. The other is FM 3-0, Operations. FM 1's audience includes the Executive Branch; Congress; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Joint Staff; combatant commanders; other Services; officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted Soldiers of all Army components; and Army civilians. FM 1 is prepared under the direction of the Army Chief of Staff. It states what the Army is, what the Army does, how the Army does it, and where the Army is going. It establishes the Army's operational concept and other fundamental principles for employing landpower in support of the National Security, National Defense, and the National Military Strategies. FM 1 delineates the Army's purpose, roles, and functions as established by the Constitution; the Congress, in Title 10, United States Code; and the Department of Defense, in Department of Defense Directive 5100.1. FM 1 is also the Army Chief of Staff's vision for the Army. To facilitate joint interdependence, Army doctrine supports and is consistent with joint doctrine. FM 1 connects Army doctrine to joint doctrine as expressed in the relevant joint doctrinal publications, especially,

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, and Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. FM 1 also links the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies with the Army's operational doctrine in FM 3-0.

Space Capstone Publication Spacepower

FM 3-0 is one of the Army's two capstone doctrinal publications; the other is FM 1, The Army. FM 3-0 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. The eight chapters that make up this edition of Operations constitute the Army's view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-0 also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Education System curricula:

- Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army's expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is Soldiers and leaders who remain the Army's most important advantage.
- Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. This chapter helps Army leaders to understand and differentiate between the requirements of diverse joint operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. It shapes supporting doctrine for each operational theme.
- Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; it describes the Army's operational concept— full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations. It establishes mission command as the preferred method of exercising battle command.
- Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full spectrum operations. It replaces the older battlefield operating systems ("BOS") with six warfighting functions, bound by leadership and employing information as the elements of combat power. Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff.
- Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and how they affect the operations process—plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess.
- Chapter 6 discusses operational art, offering Army commanders a bridge between military theory and practice.
- Chapter 7 is about information superiority, particularly the five Army information tasks, purpose, and staff responsibility.
- Chapter 8 discusses the requirement for Army forces in joint campaigns conducted across intercontinental distances. It frames the challenges created by the requirement for Army forces in terms of strategic and operational reach.

Four appendixes complement the body of the manual. The principles of war and operations are in appendix A. Command and support relationships are in appendix B. A brief description of modular force is in appendix C. And a discussion of the purpose of doctrine in the Army is in appendix D. This appendix includes a chapter-by-chapter summary of the important changes made in this edition of FM 3-0. It also includes tables listing new, modified, and rescinded terms for which this manual is the proponent. Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-0 links landpower doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. FM 3-0 also uses text and concepts developed with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. When published, Allied Joint Publication 3.2, Doctrine for Land Operations, will contain this material. The principal audience for FM 3-0 is the middle and senior leadership of the Army.

Military Professionalism and the Early American Officer Corps, 1789-1796

The United States Army is currently at a major crossroads with respect to training. Experiences from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the introduction of Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and its equal importance placed on offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations, combined with the necessity to be prepared for future conflicts all present a complex problem for Army. Further complicating the situation is increasingly limited resources for the military. The lack of resources includes limited time available to train due to a very demanding operational tempo and finite defense funding. In light of these issues, the Army leadership is faced with making training decisions that not only affect today's fight, but also future operations. No one can predict where, when, why, and how the next conflict will be fought. If the nation calls upon the Army to accomplish an objective, the Army must be prepared to achieve success. As General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, states, "It is simply impossible to plan and train for every possible scenario our Soldiers and their leaders may encounter within the complex reality of the contemporary operating environment." The

decisions made today regarding how the Army should train are the cornerstone for success during the next conflict or task. To determine what the future training concepts of the Army should be, this monograph reviews three areas which develop how the Army should train for future operations. The three areas which impact future training are the requirements given to Army from the Army's current operations, national strategy documents, and finally the future operational environment. Integrated into the analysis of those three areas is an analysis of the Army's current training doctrine from Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations to determine the current training doctrine prepares the Army for its future operations. The analysis addresses how the Army can best train for future operations when it has a wide range of missions, a lack of time to train, is preoccupied with current operations, is facing a complex and ambiguous future operating environment, and shrinking resources. Adding to the problem is a training doctrine which does not fully prepare the Army for future operations and take into account the current operational environment. Finally the monograph presents recommendations for preparing the Army for future operations. Based on this analysis of the Army's current operational environment, national strategy documents, and the future operational environment, the Army should prepare for the next mission or conflict by training on core tasks which span the spectrum of conflict, increase focus on leadership training, and train intangible attributes such as discipline, adaptability, initiative, and problem solving skills. The Army does not have enough time and resources to train for every mission and conflict, and focusing on a core task list which spans the spectrum of conflict, it can adapt those core skills to succeed in an ambiguous and complex future. Complimenting the core competency task list is an increased focus on leaders and leadership training. Future leaders must have the attributes necessary to succeed in a complex and constantly changing operating environment. The intangible attributes required by not only leaders, units and Soldiers are discipline, initiative, problem solving skills, and adaptability.

FM 1 the Army

Field Manual FM 3-0 Operations February 2008 US Army